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A minimal second order modal logic of natural kinds is formulated. Concepts 
are distinguished from properties and relations in the conceptual-logistic 
background of the logic through a distinction between free and bound predicate 
variables. Not all concepts (as indicated by free predicate variables) need 
have a property or relation corresponding to them (as values of bound predicate 
variables). Issues pertaining to identity and existence as impredicative concepts 
are examined and an analysis of mass terms as nominalized predicates for 
kinds of stuff is proposed. The minimal logic is extendible through a summum 
genus, an infima species or a partition principle for natural kinds. 
A standard objection to quantified modal logic is that it breeds 
such reptiles of the mind as Aristotelian essentialism, "the doctrine 
that some of the attributes of a thing (quite independently of the 
language in which the thing is referred to, if at all) may be essential 
to the thing, and others accidental" ([5], p. 173f.). This objection 
has been criticized on one front by pointing out that none of the 
standard systems of quantified modal logic commit us to more than 
the meaningfulness of the non-trivial versions of the doctrine and 
that indeed we can, if we so choose, actually deny such versions 
in these systems (cf. [4]). A more heroic response, however, accepts 
these versions of the doctrine, at least when properly stated, and 
finds quantified modal logic the appropriate medium for its formulation. 
In what follows I shall attempt to formulate one such response, at 
least for the purpose of clarifying the general sort of logistic framework 
it presupposes if not also for exposing some of the more fascinating 
serpents that breed therein. 
1. Natural Kinds. The properties that are essential to a thing are 
properties it necessarily has whenever it exists. Logically necessary 
properties, if there really be such, are of course essential to everything. 
These, however, are not the sort of property I have in mind in the 
version of the doctrine I want to discuss. Nor for that matter is 
logical necessity the sort of necessity I have in mind either. The 
clearest sort of framework for which I can make philosophical sense 
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ON THE LOGIC OF NATURAL KINDS 
of logical necessity is logical atomism, and in that framework what 
is necessary for one object is necessary for all, an altogether trivial 
and uninteresting version of essentialism (cf. [2]). 
The sort of essential properties I want to consider can best be 
called natural kinds. These properties, roughly speaking, are natural 
powers or capacities which things have to act, behave, function, etc., 
in certain specific determinate ways; and in this respect, they are 
causal structures grounding the law-like behavior of things of that 
kind. 
I shall not explicitly assume in any of the logics that are formulated 
here that there are any natural kinds in reality, nor for that matter 
that there are any properties or relations in the world at all. Neverthe- 
less, informally I understand natural kinds to include the various 
genera and species of plants and animals as well as the natural kinds 
of substances (in the chemical sense) such as gold, water, oxygen, 
etc. These latter might also be called "stuff," and, as indicated, 
I include as natural kinds of stuff compound substances such as water 
or salt as well as elementary substances such as gold, iron, oxygen, 
etc. 
Whether heterogeneous stuff, on the other hand, such as wood, 
or alloys such as brass or bronze, or mixtures such as sugary water, 
dirty water, mud or dirt, etc., are also natural kinds of stuff I leave 
to the context of application to decide. For example, in the context 
of providing a linguistic analysis of mass terms such as is recommended 
in the extended theory described in Section 4 below where mass 
terms are nominalized predicates for natural kinds of stuff, it becomes 
convenient on purely linguistic grounds to construe predicates for 
alloys and mixed materials as predicates for natural kinds. However, 
for the more demanding purposes of natural science, an appropriate 
application of the system will probably require that predicate constants 
introduced for natural kinds must satisfy certain further theoretical 
constraints, particularly such as are indicative of their causal explana- 
tory role within the framework of the science or sciences in question. 
In particular, however, I see no reason why some, if not all, of 
the monadic theoretical predicates of a given science might not 
designate natural kinds, though these may for the most part be kinds 
of "things," e.g., electrons or protons, rather than kinds of stuff. 
By a "thing" in the scare-quoted sense of the word I mean an 
individual that is somehow a whole which is more than the sum of 
its constitutive parts or of the bits of stuff that make it up; that 
is, roughly what Aristotle would call a "primary substance." An animal 
or a plant, for example, is a "thing" that may change much of the 
material stuff that makes it up while still remaining the same animal 
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or plant. A vein of gold in a mountain or the sodium chloride in 
my salt shaker, on the other hand, are individual bits of these natural 
kinds of stuff and in that regard they too are things (values of individual 
variables). But I do not consider them to be material "things" in 
the scare-quoted sense, i.e., as individual wholes which in their material 
mode of being are more than the mereological sum of the bits of 
stuff that make them up. An atom of gold or a NaCI molecule, 
however, are "things" qua being an atom of gold or a NaCI molecule. 
Qua being a bit of gold or a bit of salt an individual is not a "thing" 
in the scare-quoted sense (unless it is a minimal bit of that natural 
kind of stuff). 
2. Physical or Nomological Necessity. As these brief remarks indicate, 
natural kinds are material and not logical essences, or to adopt Locke's 
terminology they are real and not nominal essences. Accordingly, 
the type of necessity or possibility which is appropriate in the logic 
of natural kinds is one pertaining to a material and not a logical 
modality. One view of such a modality is Aristotle's, for whom that 
is necessary which is always the case, and, dually, that which is 
possible is what is sometimes the case in the infinitude of time (cf. 
[3], chapter V). Such a view suffices for all that I have to say here 
regarding necessity and possibility. 
A more liberal and controversial view, however, allows for a sense 
of necessity somehow determined by the laws of nature, whatever 
they may be. Possible worlds then are worlds in which the same 
laws of nature hold as hold here. Since worlds in which our laws 
of nature do not hold may be worlds in which what are natural kinds 
here need not be natural kinds there, such worlds are not worlds 
that are possible in our present sense of nomological possibility. 
A more stringent intermediate view, on the other hand, takes a 
world to be a possible world relative to ours if and only if it is 
physically accessible to ours by some causal means (with light signals 
as an upper bound on causal influences). Possible worlds in other 
words are to be the alternative world-lines of the same cosmic system 
of world-lines to which our world-line(s) belong(s). And belonging 
to the same cosmic system in this sense entails our having the same 
laws of nature in the sense in which these are what hold invariantly 
through all the world-lines of our cosmic system. 
Whatever the sense of natural or physical necessity we might choose 
in applications, the only assumption I shall make here is that the 
transworld relation of accessibility is both reflexive and transitive, 
i.e., that the strictly modal principles involved are those of the system 
S4. This assumption is clearly justified under the causal transmission 
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interpretation of necessity, i.e., where accessibility is through a chain 
of causal influences between world-lines; and under the more restricted 
temporal interpretation we would justify not only transitivity and 
reflexivity but symmetry as well (with respect to any given "local 
time"). The assumption amounts at best then to a restriction as to 
how liberal an interpretation nomological necessity will be allowed 
to have. 
Aside from the strictly modal principles of S4, an example of a 
mixed modal principle which will be valid in what I take to be the 
minimal system of a logic of natural kinds is the principle that an 
individual can belong to a natural kind only if being of that kind 
is essential to it, i.e., only if it must be an individual of that kind 
whenever it exists: 
(K1) VxVk F(O F(x) --> [ EE!(x)--> F(x)]) 
where Vk is the universal quantifier ranging over natural kinds and 
'E!' is the predicate for material existence. 
I do not assume that the predicate for material existence either 
stands for a material property of individuals or that it is a primitive 
sign of the logic of natural kinds. It does express or stand for a 
concept, however, whose analysis we will return to later. For now 
we only note that not every individual (qua value of a bound individual 
variable) is assumed to fall under that concept, i.e., it may be that 
some individuals do not now have a material existence. 
Logical objects, of course, such as classes, if such there be, do 
not ever have a material existence, and hence these individuals trivially 
do not fall under that concept. But more than these, for example, 
where possibility is what is sometimes the case, either in our world 
or in one causally accessible to ours, past or future objects need 
not now have material existence, though they will still be reckoned 
here as individuals falling within the range of our quantifier. And 
if possibility is allowed the yet more liberal interpretation, we shall 
similarly allow for possible objects that do not ever materially exist 
in our cosmos, so long as they have material existence in some 
nomologically possible world. 
Another mixed modal principle which I assume to be valid even 
in the minimal system is the assumption that the properties that are 
'If the modal logic in question is S5 rather than S4, then (K1) can be replaced 
by: 
(KI') VxVkF(F(x)----> [E!(x)--> F(x)]) 
i.e., the principle that every natural kind to which an individual belongs is essential 
to that individual. 
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natural kinds in our world are natural kinds in all physically possible 
worlds:2 
(K2) Vk FC3k G(F -G) 
The quasi-identity sign '-' between predicate variables we take to 
be abbreviatory for necessary material equivalence: 
(F G) = df dVx [F(x) -> G(x)] 
Unlike concepts, I understand material properties or relations to be 
no further discernible than through all their physically or nomologically 
realizable instances. 
A further mixed modal principle which I take to be valid is the 
obvious assumption that every natural kind is physically or nomologi- 
cally realizable: 
(K3) Vk FO3xF(x) 
Aristotle made the stronger assumption that a natural kind cannot 
"be" unless it is actually realized, which together with (K2), has 
the consequence that every natural kind necessarily has an instance: 
Vk FL3xF(x) 
This latter thesis might perhaps even be acceptable if all it meant 
was that each natural kind must be realized in each physically possible 
world sometime or other. But that is not Aristotle's notion of necessity 
and his version seems to commit us to the view that somehow a 
natural kind cannot be unless it always has an instance, a consequence 
of which is the doctrine of the fixity of species. 
Naturally, we intend not only to acknowledge the unfortunate 
extinction of many species but also the evolution of new species 
from old ones. It is even possible that a species may become extinct 
and then re-emerge or evolve again at a later time, as is indeed the 
case with the transuranic elements. Natural kinds as determinate causal 
structures or patterns in nature have a material potentiality to be 
realized, even when there are no individuals of that kind, no less 
than do material objects have their own form of potential existence 
prior to their actual coming-to-be. Thus when nature finished with 
the earth as we know it today it contained 92 chemical elements 
or elementary substances with uranium as the heaviest naturally 
occurring on earth. Whether atoms of transuranic elements exist in 
2This principle has the commutative law 
]DVkF -- Vk FD 
as one of its consequences. 
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the universe outside the earth is for the most part unknown. But 
even if they do not, these elements are no less natural kinds of 
elementary substances than are those whose atoms abound in nature. 
Indeed, so much is known about these elementary causal structures 
that transuranic atoms have actually been generated in accelerators 
by bombardment of other elements with heavy nuclei. The latest 
such elementary substance to have atoms generated in this manner 
is element 106, whose half-life is 0.9 seconds. 
Before concluding this section I should perhaps note that the modal 
operator O for physical or nomological possibility does not represent 
anything like Aristotle's notion of physical capacity or potentiality. 
Thus, assuming that oak trees are a natural kind and that an oak 
tree acorn is not an actual but only a potential oak tree, then, by 
(K1), there is no physically or nomologically possible world, i.e., 
a world where the laws of nature are as they are here, in which 
it, the acorn, is an oak tree. Similarly, assuming that humans are 
a natural kind and that a human fetus is not an actual but only a 
potential human, then there is no physically or nomologically possible 
world where it, the fetus, is a human. 
Where possibility is what is sometimes the case, the principle (K1) 
may lead to some confusion about the nature of identity. Thus 
corresponding to every human and to every oak tree there did exist 
a human fetus and an oak tree acorn which became that human, 
and that oak tree, respectively. But 'becoming', as Aristotle says, 
has many meanings (Physics I, 7, 190a 32), and the coming-to-be 
of an oak tree from an acorn or of a human from a fetus need 
not-and cannot, if oak trees and humans are natural kinds-be 
interpreted as a coming-to-be of the same individual or material unity 
changing in one or more of its non-essential properties. An alternative 
interpretation is that it is one kind of individual being which is generated 
from another causally related kind, where the transmutation of the 
one material unity into the other is a consequence of the laws of 
nature. Similarly, if atoms are atoms only qua being atoms of a natural 
kind of an elementary substance, then when Rutherford transmuted 
a sample of nitrogen into oxygen by bombarding the former with 
alpha particles, atoms of nitrogen became atoms of oxygen, even 
though it is not the case that one and the same atom is at one time 
a nitrogen atom and at a later time an oxygen atom. Nor under similar 
assumptions is a neutron a composite of a proton and an electron, 
even though it has the physical capacity or potentiality for disintegrating 
into such; nor of course is a neutron, which upon disintegration becomes 
an electron and a proton, identical with either that electron or that 
proton. In these matters it is science and not logic that is at issue. 
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3. The Conceptual-Logistic Background. The principles (K 1)-(K3) cited 
above along with the two auxiliary schemas 
(K4) VkF( > --  ) -- (VkF -> VkFti) 
(K5) VF{ -V> kF4 
and the S4 modal principles characterize what I take to be the minimal 
system of a logic of natural kinds, at least when these are embedded 
in a logical framework encompassing the valid schemas of first-order 
logic with identity and some minimal assumptions regarding predicate 
quantifiers. Subsequently, in sections 7-8, we shall consider certain 
extensions of this minimal system, i.e., extensions determined by 
additional mixed modal principles regarding natural kinds. At the 
present juncture, however, I shall attempt to explain how I understand 
the conceptual-logistic background implicit in all of these systems. 
A purely set-theoretic semantics or model theory characteristic of 
these systems, i.e., for which completeness theorems are forthcoming, 
can be found in the appendix. 
In the way of logical grammar, I shall assume the usual terminology 
and distinctions of pure second-order modal logic with identity, except 
for the addition of the universal and existential quantifiers for natural 
kinds.3 Applications of the pure grammar will in general be restricted 
to the introduction only of predicate constants and the postulates 
intended for them, among which may be included meaning postulates. 
It is assumed that every wff (well-formed formula) which is an instance 
of a valid schema of first-order logic with identity is also valid here. 
It is not assumed, however, that all the wffs that are instances of 
valid schemas of standard second-order logic are also valid here. 
In general, I shall speak of a predicate or open wff as expressing 
or standing for a possible (first-level) concept relative to certain of 
the free individual variables occurring therein (as argument indicators). 
By the possibility of a concept I mean the capacity humans (or thinkers 
in general) have to formulate and exercise that concept in either overt 
or covert acts of judgment, regardless of whether the concept has 
been formulated and exercised thus far or not. I assume in this regard 
that every possible (first-level) concept is in principle expressible by 
some predicate or open wff, whether of the pure or applied form 
of the logical grammar. However, other than the minimal metalinguistic 
condition that different expressions for the same concept must be 
analytically equivalent, I shall leave the choice and decision for all 
3We use 'x', 'y', 'z', ..., for individual variables and 'F"', 'G"', 'H', ..., for 
n-place predicate variables. We delete the superscript when the context makes clear 
the degree of the predicate variable in question. 
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further conditions regarding the "individuation" of concepts to the 
particular contexts of application. 
This "pragmatic" position regarding the individuation of concepts 
is possible in the present framework, it should be noted, precisely 
because it is not concepts that our predicate quantifiers range over 
but physical or material properties and relations instead. However, 
notwithstanding the fact that they are not the values of the bound 
n-place predicate variables, n-ary concepts may nevertheless be viewed 
informally as the values of free n-place predicate variables, since 
it is not assumed in the present framework that whatever is the value 
of a free n-place predicate variable is also the value of a bound 
n-place predicate variable. In this respect, concepts differ from material 
properties and relations somewhat in the way that merely possible 
objects differ from existing objects in those modal logics which quantify 
only over the individuals existing in the world in question while allowing 
free individual variables to have objects existing in other worlds as 
their values. In the present framework, we take the latter distinction, 
but not the former, to be without merit. That is, in the present 
framework the distinction between the conceptual and the real applies 
only to predicable entities, i.e., to concepts and material properties 
and relations, and not at all to individuals.4 
Now it will no doubt be noted that this distinction between concepts 
on the one hand and properties and relations on the other is without 
much import in the present logical grammar if we assume the general 
comprehension principle: 
(CP) 3FDVx,...Vxn [F(x, ,.. x,) <- (] 
for all open wffs (, where 'x 1', ... 'x ' are among the distinct individual 
variables occurring free in ( and 'F' is an n-place predicate variable 
not occurring (free) in ). For in that case we would be assuming 
the existence of a property or relation corresponding to each n-ary 
concept indicated by a free n-place predicate variable; and, accordingly, 
without incorporating further logistic devices for distinguishing be- 
tween the conceptual and the real, we would in effect be identifying 
concepts with their corresponding properties and relations.5 
However, in so far as predicate quantifiers are understood to range 
4This is not to say of course that the notion of a possible object which never 
exists at any (local) time of any world-line of our cosmos, i.e., a merely nomologically 
possible object in our liberal sense, is also not without merit. 
5In a somewhat richer system where, e.g., a logical device for something like Sellars' 
dot-quotes has been incorporated and systematically developed we might allow (CP) 
for special predicate quantifiers ranging over concepts as predicate senses or linguistic 
types in a sense akin to Sellars' (cf. Sellars [6]). These predicate quantifiers of course 
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over physical or material properties and relations, the assumption 
that (CP) should be valid is completely unfounded and seems in general 
to be based upon a confusion between the conceptual and the real. 
On the other hand, the fact that (CP) is not valid in general should 
not be thought to imply that material properties and relations are 
in some sense "ontologically simple," particularly since special in- 
stances of (CP) involving rather complex and perhaps even impredica- 
tive comprehending wffs will usually be assumed in particular contexts 
of application.6 
Thus, whether there really are any material properties or relations, 
and, in particular, whether there are any natural kinds in the world 
or not is a matter for science and not for logic to decide. Accordingly, 
while it is assumed (even if only as vacuously true) that every material 
property or relation of our world is a material property or relation 
in every physically or nomologically possible world: 
VFn E3G (F = G) 
it is not also assumed, at least not on logical grounds alone, that 
there is a material property or relation corresponding to any possible 
concept, i.e., the consistency of the following schema is allowed 
in the present framework: 
-3Gn(Ft= G") 
We might note in regard to the consistency of this last wff that 
even though n-place predicate quantifiers do not range over possible 
n-ary concepts, we can simulate a weak form of such quantification 
indirectly by a metalinguistic quantification over n-place predicates 
or open wffs (relative to n individual variables specified as argument 
indicators), particularly since it is assumed that every possible concept 
is in principle expressible by a predicate or open wff. Thus while 
must then be distinguished from those ranging over material properties and relations 
as potentially real material forms in nature. 
The fact, incidentally, that (CP) in such a richer system allows for the specification 
of impredicative concepts, i.e., concepts whose specification involves predicate quanti- 
fiers, would not be seen as objectionable in the framework of a holistic ralitionalist 
theory of mind. And the fact that the mind has the innate capacity to formulate 
and exercise such concepts may well be the necessary basis for the principles needed 
to account for initial language acquisition. 
6The notion of impredicativity applies primarily to wffs and secondarily to concepts 
as the conceptual counterparts of open wffs. I do not assume, on the other hand, 
that it has any application to material properties or relations even when these are 
theoretically projected or posited only through impredicative concepts. This is because 
material properties and relations do not depend on the structure of thought the way 
concepts do. 
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(CP) is not taken to be a valid principle, the (metalinguistic) substitution 
rule: 
(S) if Ft 4, then F S=,F(x,...n)" 
is presumed to be valid in all our systems. This rule, as noted, while 
not equivalent to (CP), nevertheless allows for the requisite weak 
sense of quantification over concepts. 
In concluding this section, it should perhaps be noted once again 
that while concepts are assumed to depend on the cognitive capacity 
of the human mind, material properties and relations, and natural 
kinds in particular, are presumed to be potentially real material forms, 
physical states, or causal structures in nature. Accordingly, if to the 
concept horse there corresponds a natural kind, a causal ground or 
basic genetic form which is found in all and only horses, then the 
latter, unlike the concept to which it corresponds, depends no more 
on the cognitive capacity of the human mind then do the horses 
it is found in. Moreover, no presumption is made here that the 
conceptual content of the concept horse, at least as we exercise that 
concept in ordinary language today, somehow contains or entails the 
conceptual counterparts of any or all of the material properties that 
are causal consequences of belonging to that natural kind, as though 
to have the concept as a realized cognitive capacity were to suffice 
to know the details of the basic genetic plan for being a horse. 
4. Natural Kinds as Classes and Mereological Sums. Despite the fact 
that concepts are cognitive capacities and properties and relations 
are potentially real material forms, both, from the logical point of 
view of the present framework, are presumed to be entities of a 
strictly predicable nature, i.e., both are semantically associated only 
with predicates or open wffs. It is intended, however, that their strictly 
predicable nature extends beyond the parochial confines of our present 
rules of well-formedness. For it is our view that neither concepts 
on the one hand nor properties and relations on the other have an 
individual nature, i.e., neither can fall under concepts or have properties 
and stand in relations in anything at all like the sense in which individuals 
do (though they may fall within second-level concepts or material 
structures in a related analogical sense). 
I do not deny that the opposite appears to be the case in the 
surface grammar of ordinary language. Nor do I intend to cease 
exploiting that appearance for the practical and informal expository 
purposes of this paper. Nor, moreover, do I wish to deny that there 
may well be a genuine philosophical insight behind that surface 
appearance; indeed one very much to the point regarding the real 
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conceptual distinction between our two types of natural kinds, though 
it certainly is not what either platonists or nominalists have traditionally 
taken it to be. 
In the way of an explanation of these remarks let us consider 
the possibility of extending our present rules of well-formedness so 
as to allow for the occurrence of nominalized predicates, i.e., occur- 
rences of predicates (or of open wffs if the X-operator is also available) 
occupying positions now occupied only by individual variables. We 
cannot of course interpret such occurrences as referring to the concepts 
or properties which the same predicates express or stand for when 
occurring in predicate positions, at least not if concepts and properties 
really do not have an individual nature either in the subjective structure 
of thought or in the objective structure of the world. Rather, following 
Frege's original insight on this matter, we are to interpret nominalized 
predicates as referring to certain individuals that are systematically 
correlated in the structure of thought with the concepts expressed 
by predicate position occurrences of these same predicates. Adopting 
Frege's terminology, I shall call such individuals concept-correlates. 
Now within the sort of logical framework which I have been 
describing, the concept-correlates of concepts of natural kinds of 
stuff as opposed to those of natural kinds of "things" are of particular 
interest. For from the point of view of this framework, as extended 
so as to allow nominalized predicates, the real logical or conceptual 
difference between these different types of natural kinds is a difference 
not in their predicable nature, a thesis which even the more restricted 
grammar maintains but is unable to explain, but in the individual 
nature of the type of individual with which each is correlated. Thus, 
on this view, the individual which is correlated with the concept 
of a natural kind of "thing" is the class of all the individuals of 
that kind, an individual whose individuality is abstract or logical and 
therefore not of that or any other natural kind. The individual which 
is correlated with the concept of a natural kind of stuff, on the other 
hand, is on this view the spatio-temporally scattered individual which 
is the mereological sum of all the individuals of that kind, an individual 
which is itself of that natural kind and whose individuality is therefore 
of a material nature. 
As correlates of concepts of natural kinds, these different types 
of individuals bring with them in the structure of thought certain 
dyadic or relational concepts under which they stand to all the 
individuals falling under the concept of the kind of which they are 
correlates. Thus all the individuals of a natural kind of "thing" belong 
to or are members of the class of things of that kind; and all the 
individuals of a natural kind of stuff are bits of the mereological 
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sum of these individuals. It is this relational terminology and the 
individual nature of these concept-correlates which have become 
conflated in the surface grammar of ordinary language with the 
terminology of predication and the strictly predicable nature of 
concepts or properties. 
However this conflation has come about, and independently of 
whether we accept the metaphysics of this extended view, I shall 
myself continue to exploit the convenience of this mixed terminology 
by speaking of the individuals of a natural kind as belonging to or 
being bits of the kind itself. In this way I shall speak as though 
there were two forms of predication for each type of natural kind-in- 
deed, as though predication were itself a relation between individuals. 
From the conceptual point of view of this grammatical extension 
of the minimal system, the fundamental error of both platonism and 
nominalism is that each conflates properties or concepts with their 
correlates and thereby confuses predication either with membership- 
or exemplification, a supposed non-extensional counterpart of mem- 
bership-on the one hand, or with the mereological bit-of relation 
on the other. From the perspective of even the minimal system, 
however, predication is not a relation, or at least not a relation between 
individuals, though it may be an (unequal-leveled) second-level dyadic 
concept between individuals and (first-level) concepts, some of the 
latter of which may have corresponding (material) properties.7 
5. Identity. I should like to maintain the general thesis that logical 
or formal concepts under which individuals fall, i.e., formal first-level 
concepts, are all of them derivative concepts based upon purely formal 
second- or higher-level concepts. On this view, as I understand it, 
formal first-level concepts, unlike most of their descriptive coun- 
terparts,8 enter into our conceptual framework in an essentially 
7The terminology of levels throughout is essentially that of Frege. While many of 
the views expressed here are reminiscent of Frege's, I do not assume that concepts 
or properties and relations have a strictly predicable nature in anything at all like 
the sense he intended, viz., that they are unsaturated functions from individuals to 
truth-values. The model theory in the appendix, however, does use set-theoretic functions 
of this sort as mathematical counterparts of concepts and the latter as counterparts 
of their corresponding properties and relations when such are presumed to exist in 
the model in question. 
8The descriptive concepts that are strictly theoretical constructs of a scientific theory 
are in my view only impredicatively specifiable in terms of the Hilbert E-operator 
(for predicate variables) applied to the theoretical postulates of the theory (cf. Carnap 
[1]). Since the Ramsey-sentence of these postulates with their theoretical predicates 
so specified is then a consequence of the theory, these are, accordingly, descriptive 
concepts for which we posit corresponding material properties and relations in the 
world. Not all, or perhaps not even any, of the remaining so-called observational 
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impredicative manner. Such a mode of entry explains in particular 
why there are and can be no material properties or relations corre- 
sponding to these concepts.9 
Unfortunately, however, our non-allowance of (CP) leaves indis- 
cernibility inadequate as a basis for the substitutivity of identity, and 
for this reason we have taken the latter as a logical primitive, as 
though the dyadic concept it stands for were a simple relational concept 
in the structure of thought. Of course, precisely because of the 
substitutivity of identity even in contexts with predicate quantifiers 
it is clear that identity entails and therefore contains impredicative 
content. 
I have already noted that the concept of identity may lead to some 
confusion in the context of a logic of natural kinds of "things," 
as when an acorn becomes an oak tree, or when a fetus becomes 
a human. This possibility of confusion is no less in the context of 
natural kinds of stuff, as when a gold nugget becomes a ring, is 
melted down and becomes a nugget once again, or when a sample 
of salt becomes samples of sodium and chlorine gas after an electric 
current is passed through it. And artifacts have their identity "crises" 
too, as with the wooden ship all the boards of which are removed 
and replaced one by one over a period of time and later put together 
again to form another (?) or the same (?) original ship. 
What these and similar conceptual puzzles show us is that identity 
is a complex formal concept inextricably bound to our various principles 
of individuation. Such principles, however, ultimately depend in their 
different formulations on different conceptual or metaphysical 
schemes. Independently of such a scheme and principles of individua- 
tion integral to that scheme there just is no pure and simple concept 
of identity, despite our formalistic pretensions to the contrary. 
From a strictly conceptual point of view, for example, the principles 
of individuation for logical objects, e.g., classes, are perhaps the 
clearest we can formulate, at least in so far as these objects have 
a purely formal or conceptual mode of being. Thus the principle 
of individuation for classes is compactly stated in the extensionality 
law: classes are identical when and only when they have the same 
members. Membership in a class, however, with or without the explicit 
concepts of the theory need also have a material property or relation corresponding 
to them in the world. This ontological asymmetry between theoretical and observational 
concepts, like their supposed converse epistemological asymmetry, is reminiscent of 
the traditional distinction between concepts of primary and secondary qualities. 
9The same explanation does not apply to the theoretical constructs that are only 
impredicatively specified in terms of the Hilbert e-operator (for predicate variables) 
precisely because the predicate that expresses or stands for the construct is bound 
by the operator. 
214 
This content downloaded from 129.079.038.244 on July 30, 2018 09:25:41 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
ON THE LOGIC OF NATURAL KINDS 
presence of the variable-binding (second-level) class-abstraction 
operator, is an impredicative dyadic concept through which classes 
have their peculiarly dependent or purely relational mode of being. 
Viewed in this respect the impredicative character of class-identity 
stands out as rather obvious. 
Our principles of individuation for bits of stuff, on the other hand, 
are a mixed bag of conceptual rules consisting in part of "individuating 
standards," as when we speak of a body or cupful of water, or a 
vein or nugget of gold, as opposed to water or gold simpliciter; and 
in part also of certain mereological laws as that bits of a natural 
kind of stuff are identical (qua being bits of that natural kind) when 
and only when every (minimal) bit of the one is a (minimal) bit of 
the other. Here the suppression not only of individuating standards 
but of the kinds of stuff implicit in mereological laws allows us again 
to overlook the complex and impredicative character of identity. 
The individuation of a material "thing" in our scare-quoted sense 
is a more complex matter, however, for here we confront artifacts 
as well as "things" belonging to a natural kind. Principles of individua- 
tion for artifacts refer us not to the material nature of such a "thing" 
so much as to certain human standards, e.g., implicit or explicit 
normative rules, concepts or the like, regarding the social function, 
purpose, or moral or aesthetic significance of that "thing." In contrast, 
the materially real individuation of a natural kind of "thing" depends 
not at all on our normative standards but on a materially real form 
or structure constituting the individual material nature of that "thing." 
One possible extension of our present logical grammar wherein 
we might attempt a formal representation of such individual natures 
is the addition of quantifiers binding second-level variable-binding 
formula operators such as the universal or existential quantifiers for 
individual variables. The free occurrence of such an operator expresses 
or stands ifor what we, following Frege, have been calling second-level 
concepts (within, not under, which first-level concepts fall). Of course 
like first-level concepts, not all second-level concepts would have 
a material form or structure corresponding to them in the world. 
Thus, while associated with every individual there is, on the one 
hand, a second-level concept within which fall all and only those 
first-level concepts under which that individual falls-a second-level 
concept which, adopting Duns Scotus' terminology, we might call 
the haecceity of that individual-there would exist in the world, on 
the other hand, material forms or structures corresponding only to 
those second-level concepts that are the haecceity of a "thing" 
belonging to a natural kind. Such a material form or structure would 
causally account for the natural kinds to which that individual belonged 
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as well as the special physical mode of being in which that individual 
is a whole which is more than the sum of its parts or of the bits 
of stuff that make it up-a whole, that is, which somehow remains 
the same individual even while changing some of its parts or the 
bits of stuff that make it up. The haecceity of an artifact or of a 
(non-minimal) bit of stuff, e.g., a bit of gold, or of a logical object, 
e.g., a class, on the other hand, would have no such material structure 
corresponding to it. 
Such are the ways in which a fuller and more explicit framework 
than the minimal system we describe here might approach the concept 
of identity. The minimal system, nevertheless, is not without its 
conceptual utility however schematic that might be, and for that reason 
we leave identity as it is. 
6. Material Existence. The impredicative character of the concept of 
physical or material existence is altogether another matter, however. 
For in this case I believe we have available just the sort of distinction 
in terms of which that concept might be analyzed and more clearly 
represented. 
That there is no one physical state or material property corresponding 
to this concept of existence is of course an old and familiar thesis 
and one with which I have no quarrel here. That is, it is assumed 
in the present framework that among the material properties that 
form and determine the existence of a physical or material object, 
it is not the case that there is one which corresponds to our concept 
of material existence. 
Nevertheless, neither this concept nor its complement is without 
its conceptual utility. For it is also not assumed here that this concept 
coincides, either necessarily or contingently, with the concept of the 
being of an individual as the value of a bound individual variable. 
Non-existence in the material mode, in other words, is not a 
necessarily vacuous concept. And if classes or other logical objects 
are presumed to be among the individuals, then it never is a vacuous 
concept. For a logical object belongs to no natural kind and falls 
under no concept to which there corresponds a material property 
or relation. 
In addition, past or future but presently non-existing objects, i.e., 
objects which do exist in the material mode either in the past or 
the future, or, on the liberal (and controversial) view, objects which 
could (in the sense of nomological possibility) so exist but which 
in fact never do: one and all fall under the concept of non-existence 
while still being the same individuals they are when they do exist, 
though of course not falling now under all the same concepts they 
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fall under then. And in this sense there is a subject of change which 
remains identical with itself even in the case of substantial coming-to- 
be (generation) or ceasing-to-be (annihilation) of a physical or material 
object, though of course, given conservation of matter and energy 
laws, this is not a coming-to-be out of, or a ceasing-to-be into, nothing. 
Relative now to concepts corresponding to which there are material 
properties or relations, presently non-existing objects, not now falling 
under any of these concepts, are one and all indiscernible each from 
the other. That is, in terms of the material properties which determine 
the world's present material existence in the sense of the totality 
of physical or material objects presently existing in the world, these 
non-existing objects are one and all indiscernible. Yet each nonetheless 
is discernible from everything else at least in terms of the temporal, 
causal and relational concepts to presently existing objects under which 
it now falls. In other words, all that their failure to exist now in 
the material mode amounts to is their failure now to have any material 
property. What this suggest, accordingly, is an analysis of material 
existence as the possession of some physical or material property: 
E !(x) df 3FF(x) 
Standing in a material relation to presently existing objects, inciden- 
tally, need not itself constitute a material property or a monadic physical 
state. To insist otherwise is to confuse logical relationships between 
concepts with potentially real material forms or causal structures. 
Accordingly, if it is possible that an existing physical object might 
stand in various material relations while not also having itself any 
material property or being in any monadic physical state, then the 
above definition would seem to be deficient. I assume that just this 
sort of situation is not possible, however, since otherwise a material 
object, and even the world as a whole, might then have a purely 
relational mode of being. 
Another assumption related to this is that the mode of being of 
an object that presently does not but could materially exist, and in 
particular that does exist in the past or future, need not be merely 
an intentional mode having no objective content independent of our 
conceptual ability to refer to it and other such non-existing objects. 
In particular, I do not see why some of the temporal or causal relational 
concepts under which non-existing objects now fall or stand to presently 
existing objects might not have material relations corresponding to 
them so that while such presently non-existing objects have now no 
material or physical properties, they nevertheless might stand now 
in certain material relations to presently existing objects. A neutron 
which became an electron and a proton is strictly speaking no longer 
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in existence. Yet its disintegration into the presently existing electron 
and proton may very well constitute a physical or material relation 
which obtains even now between it and its resulting electron-proton 
pair. Other similar material relations might obtain even now between 
a past but no longer existing acorn and a presently existing oak tree 
or between what was a human fetus and what is today a human 
being. And naturally, if such material relations are not to be excluded, 
then we cannot maintain that standing in a material relation alone 
suffices to ground the present existence of a material or physical 
object. 
If the above definition is acceptable, then, by (K5), whatever belongs 
to a natural kind exists at the time or world of such belonging, and 
therefore by (K1), (K2) and elementary transformations, an individual 
can belong to two natural kinds only if it belongs to the one when 
and only when it belongs to the other: 
(K6) VxVkFVkG(OF(x) A OG(x) -> D[F(x) -- G(x)]) 
Since it is intended that (K6) is to be valid even in the minimal 
system, it is to be taken as an additional axiom if the above definition 
for material existence, or rather the ontological claim on which it 
depends, is not found acceptable. 
7. The Summum Genus and Infima Species Principles. In turning now 
to some of the possible extensions of the minimal system which do 
not involve any changes in the logical grammar, let us say that one 
monadic concept is subsumed under or subordinate to another if it 
is necessarily included in the other. The subsumption or subordination 
is said to be proper if the latter concept is not also subsumed under 
the former: 
(F- G) = dO Vx [F(x)-- G(x)] 
(F< ) (F G) (F A -(G F) 
The first and perhaps prima facie most plausible principle beyond 
those of the minimal system is the principle that if an individual 
belongs to any natural kind at all, then there is one to which it belongs 
which has subordinate to it every natural kind to which it belongs: 
(K7) Vx[3k FF(x) -- k F(F(x) VkG [G(x) - G F])] 
As causal material structures that are not limited by our capacity 
to formulate concepts to which they may correspond, on the other 
hand, I do not see why natural kinds must satisfy this summum genus 
principle, even allowing that the family of natural kinds to which 
an individual belongs forms a chain of subordination to one another. 
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That is, I do not see why nature must conform to our finitary 
classificatory schemes by having an upper bound on every such possible 
chain of subordination between natural kinds. 
Similarly, I do not see why nature must impose a lower bound 
or an infima species on the natural kinds to which an individual may 
belong. Yet this principle too has been traditionally maintained: 
(K8) Vx[3k FF(x)-- 3k F(F(x)--> k G[G(x-> F c G])] 
Of course, if it is possible for an individual to belong to but one 
natural kind, then it is possible for the same natural kind to be both 
an infima species and a summum genus. 
8. The Partition Principle for Natural Kinds. The idea that the family 
of natural kinds to which an individual belongs determines a chain 
of subordination of these kinds one to another is itself a consequence 
of the principle that if two natural kinds are not nomologically disjoint, 
then one must be subsumed under the other: 
(K9) VkFVkG((0x[F(x) A (x)] -- F G v G <F) 
This principle does seem to be a rather natural assumption and 
appears to lead to a more plausible extension of the minimal system 
than do either (K7) or (K8). In addition, it yields as a consequence 
a partition principle for natural kinds according to which natural kinds 
that are subsumed under the same immediate genus are either nomo- 
logically identical or nomologically disjoint: 
(K10) VkFVkGVkH[F< H A G < H A VkH 
(F< H' - H H') A VkH'(G < H' -> H H') 
-> 03x(F(x) A G(x)) v (F= G)] 
It is not assumed in (K10), on the other hand, that every natural 
kind which is a species, i.e., which is properly subsumed under another 
natural kind, has an immediate genus under which it is subsumed. 
In so far as natural kinds are potentially and nomologically real 
determinate forms or material structures not dependent on our concep- 
tual classifications, I do not see why the subsumption relation between 
natural kinds might not be dense, or even continuous for that matter. 
Finally, in connection with the partition principle, another candidate 
for a logic of natural kinds is the principle that every genus is the 
sum of its species: 
(Kll) VkF[3 k G(G < F)--> l]Vx(F(x) 
> IkG[G(x) AG < F])] 
Naturally, this principle can be easily formulated so as to apply only 
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to genera that have immediate species and which are then posited 
to be the sum of these immediate species, i.e., where 'G < F' in 
(K11) is replaced by 'G < F A VkH(G < H-> F < H)'. 
9. Concluding Remarks. The above are only some of the more obvious 
principles that come to mind in the development and application of 
a logic of natural kinds. My objection to including them within the 
minimal system is based solely upon the rather strong sense of 
independence from the structure of thought (and therefore of "logic") 
which I assume natural kinds to have. Of course, in certain restricted 
contexts or for specialized applications these principles, and perhaps 
others as well, may be fully justified and used accordingly. 
There are of course other developments and applications which 
I have not touched upon at all in this paper, e.g., the analysis of 
causal counterfactuals as based upon natural kinds or of a comparative 
similarity relation between individuals in terms of the natural kinds 
they share, etc. Our interests in these sorts of developments or 
applications should, it is hoped, vindicate at least to some extent 
the ontology of natural kinds as causal or nomological essences. In 
any case, such reptiles of the mind as these are taken to be by some 
philosophers seem hardly poisonous or deadly at all. 
Finally, there is the sort of application suggested in section 4 for 
extending the logic of natural kinds to include nominalized predicates 
so as to provide a general analysis of the logic and ontology of mass 
terms. I have only hinted throughout this essay at how this richer 
framework might be developed, and though I do have some further 
suggestions which I have not gone into here, it is hoped that perhaps 
others will also take up the clarion call to defend this rather fascinating 
serpent of the mind. 
APPENDIX 
1. Syntax: 
As logical particles I shall use only -, --, D, =, V and Vk for the negation, (material) 
conditional, necessity, identity and universal quantifier signs. The quantifier V is affixed 
to both individual and predicate variables while Vk is affixed only to monadic predicate 
variables. Atomic wffs are expressions either of the form of an identity, ax = P, 
where ax, 3 are individual variables, or of the form Tr(al, ..., an), where nEw - 
{0}, Tr is an n-place predicate variable and x,, ..., on are individual variables. The 
class of wffs is the smallest class containing the atomic wffs and such that --4, Df), 
(4 I)-> V)x, Va4 r, rVka r4 are all wffs whenever 4, t are wffs, ax is an individual 
variable and -r is an n-place predicate variable, for some nEo - {0}, and cr is a 
1-place predicate variable. 
2. Semantics: 
A natural kind model (NK-model) is a structure of the form (D, I, R, (Fn)nEw 
- {0}, (K,),>E), where (1) the universe D of possibilia, and the set I of possible 
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worlds are non-empty; (2) R is a reflexive and transitive relation on I; (3) for all 
nEo - {0}, Fn C (9(Dn))'; (4) for all uED: (i) K, C F,, i.e., every natural kind 
to which the individual u belongs is a material property in the model, (ii) for all 
XEK , for some iEI, uEX;, i.e., a property is a natural kind to which u belongs 
only if u can have that property, (iii) for all X, for all vED, for all iEI, if XEkV 
and uEX; then XEK,, i.e., every natural kind to which u can belong is a natural 
kind of u, and (iv) for all XEK,, for all YEF,, for all iEI, if uEY,, then uEXi, 
i.e., u belongs to each of its natural kinds whenever it has a material property (i.e., 
whenever it exists). 
The indexed set (Fn) ., , oo specifies the (set-theoretical counterparts of the) material 
properties and relations in the NK-model. The indexed set (K,)uED specifies, for 
each uED, the set of natural kinds to which u belongs (when it exists). If u never 
belongs to any natural kind, e.g., if u is an artifact or a logical object, then Ku 
is empty. But if K, is not empty, then there is at least one possible world where 
u materially exists and at which it belongs to all of its natural kinds. Finally, the 
set of individuals which exist in the material mode at a possible world iEIl is the 
set {uED: for some YE F, uE YI). 
The additional clauses needed to validate (K7), (K8), (K9), from which (K10) follows, 
and (KII1), respectively are: 
(4/v) if Ku is not empty, then for some XEK,, for all YEK,, for all iEI, 
Y, C X,; 
(4/vi) if Ku is not empty, then for some XEK., for all YCKU, for all iEI, 
Xi C Yi; 
(4/vii) for all X, YcKU, either for all iE I, Xi C Y, or for all iEl, 
(4/viii) for all XEK, if for some YEK,, for all iEI, Y= C XK and Y = X, 
then for all iEI, Xi = {vED: for some YEKV, vEY; and Y i X 
and for all jE I, Yi C Xj} 
An assignment in an NK-model A (as described above) is a function a with the 
set of individual and predicate variables as domain and such that a(oL) E D, whenever 
a is an individual variable, and a(n)E9(Dn)1, whenever Tr is an n-place predicate 
variable. Satisfaction in A by a at a possible world iEI is defined recursively as 
follows: a sat a = ,3 in A at i iff a(a) = a(3); a sat r(a n, ..., a(x) in A at i iff 
a((l), ..., a(a,n)) E a(rr)i; a sat -4) in A at i iff a non-sat 4, in A at i; a sat ((4 
--O k) in A at i iff either a non-sat 4, in A at i or a sat 4, in A at i; a sat VOL4 
in A at i iff for all uED, a(ca/u) sat 4, in A at i; a sat VTn(4 in A at i iff for 
all XEFn, a(Trn/X) sat 4 in A at i; a sat Vkir4 in A at i iff for all uED, for 
all XEKU, a (-r/X) sat <4 in A at i; and a sat Dl) in A at i iff for all jEI, if 
iRj, then a sat 4) in A at j. 
A wff is valid in an NK-model A iff it is satisfied in A by every assignment in 
A at every possible world of A. A wff is universally valid iff it is valid in every 
NK-model. 
It is clear that (Kl) and (K6) are valid in every NK-model because of clause (4) 
parts (iii) and (iv); (K3) is valid because of clause (4) part (ii); (K5) is valid because 
of clause (4) part (i); and (K2), (K4) are valid by definition of the indexed set (K,)u, D 
3. Completeness: 
Besides the rule (S) of substitution, the rules of inference are modus ponens, 
necessitation, and universal generalization of either an individual or a predicate variable. 
The axioms of the minimal system include all the modal axioms of S4, the mixed 
modal principles (K1)-(K5), axioms for standard first order logic with identity'? together 
'0Besides Leibniz' law and the reflexive law of self-identity, it is assumed that 
VxVy[Ox = y--Lx-= y] 
is also an axiom. 
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with: 
VF" 03Gn(F G) 
VFF" ( ) --> ) ---> (VF"n() --> VF") 
4 -- VF4F") if 'F"' does not occur free in 4 
It is easily seen that every theorem generated from these axioms and inference rules 
is universally valid. It can also be shown, however, that every wff which is universally 
valid is a theorem of the minimal system. In addition, the system can be shown 
to be complete in the stronger sense that every consistent set of wffs is simultaneously 
satisfiable at some possible world in some NK-model. Similar completeness theorems 
hold for the extensions obtained by adding (K7)-(K 11) together with the above additions 
to clause (4) of the definition of an NK-model. 
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